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The defendant was convicted on an information charging that he "with
force and arms wilfully did injure a public building and house of worship
situate," &c.
On appeal it was held that the information, although in the words of
.the statute, was insufficient, in failing to set forth particularly the manner
of the injury.
As TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE DESCRIPTION OF AN OFFENCE IN
AN INDICTMENT MERELY IN THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE.

The, general rule on the subject
of the sufficiency of an indictment
is declared in the cases of U. S. v.
Mills, 7 Peters, 138 (1833); U. S.
v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360 (1877);
U. S. v. Carll, 1O5 U. S. 6II (1881),
and U. S. v. Pond, 2 Curt. C. C.
265 (1855).
In U. S. v. Mills, supra, Mr.
Justice Thompson, in delivering
the opinion of the court, said
(p. 142): "the general rule is that,
in indictments for misdemeanors
created by statute, it is sufficient to
charge the offence in the words of
the statute. There is not that technical nicety required as to form
which seems to have been adopted
and sanctioned by long practice in
cases of felony, and with respect to
some crimes, where particular
words must be used, and no other
1 25 Atlantic Rep. 477.

words, however synonymous they
may seem, can be substituted. But
in all cases the offence must be set
forth with clearness and all necessary certainty to apprise the accused
of the crime with which he stands
charged."
In U. S. v. Simmons, supra, Mr.
Justice Harlan, in delivering the
opinion of the court, said (p. 362)
"where the offence is purely
statutory, having no relation to the.
common law, it is as a general rule
sufficient in the indictment to
charge the defendant with acts
coming fully within the statutory
description, in the substantial words
of the statute without any further
expansion of the matter. ......
But to this rule there is the qualification, fundamental in the law of
criminalprocedure, thatthe accused
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must be apprised by the indictment
with reasonable certainty of the
nature of the accusation against
him, to the end that he may prepare his defence and plead the
judgment as a bar to any subsequent
prosecution for the same offence."
In U. S. v. Carll, supra, it was
held that it is not sufficient to set
forth an offence in the words of the
statute unless they "fully, directly
-and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity set forth all
the elements necessary to constitute the offence."
In U. S. v. Pond, supra, it was
held that, in general, it is sufficient
to describe an offence created by
statute, in the words of the statute,
;unless they embrace cases which
the Legislature did not intend to
include within the law. If there
be such cases, the indictment should
show that this is .not one of the
cases thus excluded.
In Hawkins Pleas of the Crown
.b. 2, c. 25, s. iI, it is said that it
is not sufficient to pursue the very
words of a statute unless by so
doing you fully and expressly allege
the fact, in the doing, or not doing,
whereof the offence consists, without any uncertainty or ambiguity.
Mr. Wharton, in his work on
Criminal Law, 7th Ed., Vol. I,
364 et seq., says, that in general it
is sufficient to describe an offence
created by statute in the words of
the statute, unless it is a case " in
which the mere recital of the
words of the statute do not constitute in completeness the description of the legal offence."
In Pennsylvania it is sufficient,
since the Criminal Procedure Act
of- March 31, i86o, if the indictment charges the offence substantially in the language of the Act of
Assembly. If, however, it is not

definite enough, the defendant can
apply for a bill of particulars, and

the district attorney will be restricted thereto : Williams v. Com.,
91 Pa. 493 (188o), and Corn. v.
Maher, 16 Phila. 451 (1883). This
makes the present law in Pennsylvania somewhat different than in
other states.
In the following cases, the indictments stated the crimes merely in
the words of the statute, and were
held to be good.
In King v. Fuller, I B. & P. 18o
(1797), itwas held sufficient to allege
an endeavor to seduce a person serving' in the king's army from his
allegiance to the king without
specifying the means employed.
So in Boyles v. Com., 2 S. & R.
(Pa.) 40 (I8s), it was decided ihat
an indictment charging the defendant with privately concealing the
death of a bastard child, need not
set forth in what manner, or by
what acts, she endeavored to do so.
But in an indictment for fornication and bastardy, the sex of the
child must be stated. Simmons v.
Com., i Rawle (Pa.), 142 (1829).
The same decision was reached
with reference to an indictment
charging the defendant with seducing and debauching a woman. The
word "seduce," when used with
reference to the conduct of a man
towards a" woman, has a precise and
determinate signification, and it is
not necessary to charge the offence
in any other language : State v.
Pierce, 27 Conn. 319 (1858), and
State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, I12 (1879).
This rule was followed even in
the case of a felony, and an indictment charging the defendant, in
the words of the statute, with committing an assault with a deadly
weapon, was upheld by the Supreme
Court of California. People v. Mar-
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seiler, Ii Pacific R. 503 (I886).
On the other hand, in some cases,
the courts have required that indictments should be extremely full
and explicit, or in other words
should be "certain to a certain intent." As examples of this class
of cases may be cited Coke on Lit.,
3o3 a King v. Airey, 2 East, 33
41802); King v. Stevens, 5 East,
244 (1804); U. S. v. Forrest, 3
Crauch C. C. 6o (1826); State v.
Seay, 3 Stewart (Ala.), 131 (183 o ) ;
Com. v. Walters, 6 Dana (Ky.),
290 (1838), and State v. Hand, I
English (Ark.), 165 (1845).
In England, under the game
laws, it is necessary to traverse
every legal qualification, as that
the defendant was not possessed of
lands of the clear yearly value of
,Cioo, &c., and itis not sufficient to
merely allege that he was not duly
or legally qualified : King v. Hill,
2 Ld. Raym. 1415 (i725), and King
v. Jarvis, i Burr. 148 0757).
In an indictment for conspiracy
it is necessary to set forth the acts
specifically, and show the intended
means by which the fraud was to
be compassed: Lambert v. People,
9 Cowen (N. Y.), 578 (1827),
and Hartman v. Com., 5 Pa. 6o
(1847).
Likewise an indictment for obtaining goods under false pretenses,
must set forth all the material facts
and circumstances which the prosecutor would be bound to prove in
order to procure a conviction :
Com. v. Strain, io Metcalf (Mass.),
521 (1845); People v. Gates, 13
Wend. (N. Y.) 311 (1835), 1 Chitty,
141 ; State v. Philbrick, 31 Me. 4O1
(I85O), and Com. v. Galbraith, 24
Leg. Int. (Pa.) 117 (1867), and Russell on Crimes, 9 th Ed., Vol. II,
669. But these details may be dispensed with by statuter State v.

Morgan,

20

S. W. Rep. (Mo.) 456

(1892).

In People v. Taylor, 3 Denio
(N. Y.), 91 (1846), the defendant
was charged with setting "on foot
a certain lottery, for the purpose of
exposing certain money to abide
the drawing of such lottery, he, the
said defendant, being unauthorized, ".&c. Held,to be insufficient
as the indictment should have given
some further description beyond a
general statement of the purpose
of the lottery. And in Markle v.
State, 3 Ind. 535 (1852), the indictment charged defendant substantially, with unlawfully making a
certain lottery for a division of
property to be determined by
chance, the making of which was
not authorized by law: Held, to be
bad for. not stating the species of
property as property is a generic
term.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in
State v. Bitman, 13 Iowa, 485 (1862),
held that an information charging
the defendant with cruelly and inhumanely whipping and beating his
own child, being about three years
old," was insufficient, in not setting out the name of the person
upon whom the offence was committed.
In Quinn v. State, 35 Ind' 485,
the indictment charged the defendant, in the words of the statute,
with haviAg voted at an election, "not having the legal qualifications
of a voter." Held, to be insufficient for not specifying what qualifications the voter lacked-foralleging, not a fact, but a conclusion of law. A similar decision
was reached in State v. Bruce, 5
Ore. 68 (1874), and State v. Moore,
3 Dutch (N.J.),^io.5 (I858). Inthe
case, however, of State v. Lockbaum, 38 Conn. 400 (1871), the
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court upheld an information charging the defendant in the words of
the statute, with attempting to vote
illegally at an elector's meeting, by
assuming the name of another.
The court said that th6 defendant
must show that additional averments are necessary to insure a fair
trial or protection against another
pfosecution.
In State v. Allen, 32 Iowa, 491
(1871), the defendant was charged
with selling "intoxicating.liquors
in violation of the laws of theState
of Iowa." Held, to be insufficient
as the name of the purchaser
should have been stated, if known.
And in People v. Burns, 6 N. Y. S.
61r (1889), the defendant was indicted for selling impure milk. On
demurrer it was held that the name
of the purchaser should have been
stated, if known, and if it was not,
such fact should have been alleged.
To constitute a sale, there must
have been a purchaser, and the defendant was entitled to be informed
who such purchaser was so that he
could disprove such sale on the
trial of the cause.
In another case, the defendant
was indicted under a statute which
provides that "every person who
shall hire any horse, and shall wilfully make any false statement
relative to the distance, time, place
or manner of using the same with
intent to defraud, shall be punished by fine," &c: Held, that it
is not sufficient to describe such an
offence in the general language of
the statute, but the misrepresentation, and the person to whom made
must be stated with particularity.
State v. Jackson, 39 Conn. 229
(1872).
In State v. Murray, 41 Iowa, 58o
(1875), the defendant was convicted
on an information charging that lie
14

did "wilfully and maliciously assault one, Bridget McCoy:" Held,
that it was insufficient in not stating "the acts constituting the
offence."
It is not enough to
merely charge the commission of a
crime by its technical name.
So, in another case, the defendant was convicted of presenting for
payment 'a
pension certificate,
which the indictment alleged he
had procured upon false and fraudulent proofs, and by unlawful and
fraudulent devices. On motion in
arrest of judgment, the court said
that the allegations were not sufficient to inform the accused, with
that certainty which the law requires, of the nature of the accusation against him, to,the end that
he might prepare his defence and
plead the judgment as a bar to any
subsequent prosecution for the same
offence. U. S. v. Goggin, x Fed.
R. 49 (188o).
On a prosecution under the Act
of May 3o, 1870, known as the
"Enforcement Act," the Supreme
Court of the United States, held
that an indictment was insufficient
which charged the defendants, substantially in the language of the
statute, with banding together with
intent to unlawfully and feloniously
iiure, oppress, threaten and intimidate two citizens of the United
States, of African descent, and prevent them from exercising their
lawful right and privilege of peaceably assembling together, and of
enjoying those rights which are
secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Mr. Chief Justice WAimt, in delivering the opinion of the court,
said (p. 558) "It is an elementary
principle ofcriminal pleading, that
where the definition of an offence,
whether it be at common law or by

210

SUFFICIENCY OF AN INDICTMENT

statute, includes generic terms, it
is not sufficient that the indictment
shall charge the offence in the same
generic terms as in the definition;
but it must state the species,-it
U.
must descend to particulars."
S. v. Cruikshank, 92 -U. S. 542
(1875).
A decision very similar to that in
the principal case was reached by
-the Supreme Court of Iowa in
State v. Bitcher, 79 Iowa, iio
.(i89o), where the defendant was
,convicted of "committing the
crime of wilfully and unlawfully
interrupting and disturbing a
school:" Held, in arrest of judgment, that the indictment was defective because the acts constituting
the offencewere.not set forth. "The
statement does not show what was
done, excepting by the averment
of a legal conclusion."
In another case the Supreme
Court of South Carolina decided
that an indictment for the violation
of a written contract to serve as a
laborer, which did not set out the
contract or show that the contract,
which is alleged to have been
broken, was one contemplated by
the statute, did not charge an indictable offence. The statute does
not purport to include every contract between a laborer and a laudlord. State v. Williams, io S. B.
R. 876 (I890).
In Luter v. State, 22 S. W. Rep.
(Tex.) 140 (1893), the defendant
was convicted on an information
charging him, in the words of the
statute, with preventing another
person from performing the duties
of "a lawful employment :" Held,
on appeal, that the information was
defective in not setting forth the
nature of the employnent
In U. S. v. Patterson, 55 Fed.
Rep. 605 (1893), the defendant was

indicted in the words of a statute
prohibiting combinations, contracts
or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
and making it a misdemeanor to
monopolize, or attempt or conspire with others to monopolize,
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations: Held,that
the indictment was insufficient, as
the means should have been stated
whereby it was sought to monopolize the market, in order that the
court might see whether they are
illegal.
It has, however, been considered that "courts should not be
astute to discover defects in an indictment," and they have, therefore, held that indictments are sufficiently technical which state the
offence so plainly that a man of
ordinary capacity would readily
understand the nature of the offence charged. This alone is the
criterion of sufficiency. Such an
indictment is "certain to a common
intent:" Stephen v. State, ii Ga.
225 (1852); Com. v. Ramsey, I
Brewster (Pa.), 422 (y867) ; State v.
Wimberly, 3 McCord (S. C.), 19o
(1825); Sherbon v. Com., 8 Watts
(Pa.), 212 (1839) ; U. S. v. Fero, 18
Fed. R. 9o (1883), and In re
McDonald, 33 Pacif. Rep. (Wyo.)
19 (1893).
In Lamberton v. State, 12 Ohio,
282 (1842), Mr. Justice Birchard, in
delivering thb opinion of the court,
said (p. 284): "It is a rule of criminal law, based upon sound principles, that every indittment should
contain a complete description of
the offence charged. That it should
set forth the facts constituting the
crime, so that the accused may have
notice of what he is to meet; of the
act done, which it behooves him to
controvert, and so that the court,
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applying the law to the facts
charged against him, may see that
a crime has been committed. A
contrary doctrine would deprive
the accused of one of the means
humanely provided for the protection of innocence." And this decision was followed in Smith v.
State, 2z Neb. 552 (1887).
It is thus seen that the defendant
must ordinarily be charged with
some particular offence, and not
with being an offender in general.
To this rule, however, there are
NoT= BY

some marked exceptions, as indictments against a common scold:
Stratton v. Com., io Metcalf
(Mass.), 217 (1845); a common barrator, Com. v. Davis, ii Pick.
(Mass.) 432 (1831) ; and the keeper
of a common bawdy-house, Com. v
Pray, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 362 (1832).
In such cases the offence may be
charged in general terms : r Chitty
Crim. Law, 23o, and Bouvier's Law
Dict., 7o.
C. PERCY " TrLLCOX.
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The principal case brings up the
question of particularity in indictments.
The general rules regarding particularity in indictments are substantially as follows:
"The degree of particularity
necessary in setting out the offence
can best be determined by examining the objects for which such
particularity is required.
These
objects may be specified as follows:
(a). In order to identify the
charges, lest the grand jury should
find a bill for one offence and the
defendant be put upon his trial for
another.
(b). That the defendant's conviction or acquittal may enure to his
subsequent protection, should he be
again questioned on the sale
grounds.
(c). To warrant the court in
granting or refusing any particular
right or indulgence, which the
defendant claims as incident to the
nature of the case.
(d). To enable the defenadant to
prepare for his defence in particular
cases, and to plead in all; or, if he
prefer it, to submit to the court by
demurrer whether the facts alleged
(supposing them to be true), so
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support the conclusion of the law,
as to render it necessary for him to
make any answer to the charge.
(e). To enable the court, looking
at the record after the conviction,
to decide whether the facts charged
are sufficient to support a conviction of the particular crime, and to
warrant their judgment.
(f). To instruct the court as to
the technical limits of the penalty
to be inflicted.
(g). To guide a court of error in
its action in revising the record."
Wharton's Criminal Practice, T66.
Indictments formerly were drawn
so as to include much which would
clearly be improper to-day as being
evidence. This was due to the fact
that the presentment of the grand
jury was formerly not only an
accusation involving a primafacie
case against .the defendant, but
practically an adjudication of facts
from which the defendant acquitted
or purged himself by the " Ordeal, "
or, though rarely by combat or
witnesses.
After time had modified the old
procedure in the modern, minuteness and particularity of statement
remained. We have examples of
this in modern times.
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For instance, the indictment in
the Webster-Parkman case charged
Dr. Webster in four, counts, with
the murder of Dr. Parkman, the
method being varied in each, and
the last being as follows: "That
the said John W. Webster, at Boston, aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, in a certain building known
as the Medical College, there situate, on the 23 d day of November
last past, in and upon the said
George Parkman, did feloniously,
willfully, and of malice aforethought, make an assault, and him,
the said George Parkman, in some
way and manner, and by some
means, instruments and weapons to
the jurors unknown, did then and
there feloniously, willfully, and of
malice aforethought, deprive of
life so that he, the said George
Parkman, then and there died."
Mr. Justice STEPHEN, in his
History of the Criminal Law of
England, comments thus on the
necessity of particularity in indictments :
" I do not think that anything
has tended more strongly to bring
the law into discredit than the
importance attached to such technicalities as these. As far as they
went their tendency was to make
the administration of justice a
solemn ° farce. Such scandals do
not seem, however, to have been
unpopular. Indeed, I have some
doubt whether they were not popular, as they did mitigate, though in
an irrational, capricious manner,
the excessive severity of the old
criminal law.
"There was a strange alteration
in the provisions of the law upon
this subject, by which irrational
advantages were given alternately
to the Crown and to the prisoner,
In favor of the prisoner it was pro-
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vided that the mosttrumpery failure
to fulfil the requirements of an
irrational system should be sufficient to secure him practical impunity for his crime. On the other
hand, in favor of the Crown, it was.
provided that the prisoner should
not be entitled to a copy of the
indictment in cases of felony, but
only to have it read over to him
slowly, when he was put up to
plead, a rule which made it exceedingly difficult for him to take
advantage of any defect. But then
,again, any person might point out
such a flaw, and it was in a sort of
a way the duty of the judge, as
counsel for the prisoner, to do so.
On the other hand, some flaws
were and others were not waived
by pleading to the indictment.
" In short it is scarcely a parody
to say that from the earliest time to
our own days the laws relating to
indictments was much as if some
small portion of the prisoners convicted had been allowed to toss up
for their liberty.
"The rule that the indictments
must set out all the elements of the
offence charged, was some sort of
security against the arbitrary multiplication of offences and extensions
of the criminal laws by judicial
legislation in times when there
were no definition of crimes established by statute,.or, indeed, by any
generally recognized authority.
If, for instance, it had been lawful
to indict a man in general terms,
say for high treason, and if the
judges had had to say what constituted high treason, the law might
have been stretched to almost any
extent. The necessity for setting
forth that the prisoner imagined
that the death of the king, and
manifested such imagihation by
such and such overt acts, was a
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considerable security against such
an extension of the law, though, as
the history of the crime of treason
will show, it was not a complete
one. The same principle was illustrated by indictments for libel in
the latter part of the last century,
and even in our own days instances
may be found in indictments for
conspiracy in which laxity of pleading might have had serious consequences to the accused, The fact
is that looseness in the legal definitions of crimes can be met only by
strictness and technicality in indictments, and that indictments may
be reduced with perfect safety to
perfect simplicity as soon as the
law has either been codified or
reduced to certainty by authoritive
writings which practically supply
the place of a code."
The history and the general rule
relating to particularity in indictments lead us to the main question
involved in the principal case,
namely, the effect of statutory
provisions providing that indictments are sufficient when the
charge is stated in the words of the
statute.
It is natural, under such provisCASES IN
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ions, to expect the prosecution to
give the defendant as little knowledge of the details of the crime
charged as possible, and for the
defendant to claim a liberal interpretation of his constitutional
rights. Around this contest the
cases naturally arrange themselves.
The statute cannot override the
defendant's constitutional right to
be "informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation," V. Amendment to Federal Constitution, and
similar provisions exist in all state
constitutions: Penna. Art. I, 9.
All statutes must be interpreted in
view of this right of the defendant.
It is clear that the defendant is
entitled to something more than to
be charged with a crime in the
words of the Act, for instance, an
indictment charging that John
Jones "had unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will" would be to
charge the crime in the words of
the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania defining the crime of rape, but
to draw a good indictment, the
prosecution would have to allege
the name of the person ravished
and the time and place.
HAS

BEEN

HELD

INSUFFICIENT

THOUGH IN THE WORDS OF THE ACT.

False Pretences.-Com. v. Mul- * of, or putting off any instrument
holland, 14 U. S. 245. Indictment -whatever, or for obtaining or
for false pretences quashed because
attempting to obtain any property
the pretences were not set out.
by false pretences, to allege that
Forgery.-Com.v. Mulholland, 5 the defendant did the act with the
W. N. C. 208. Indictment for forintent to defraud, without alleging
gery must show that the written
the intent of the defendant to
instrument was calculated to dedefraud any particular'person.I It
fraud. Judge Thayer said : "Nor
is sufficient under this section to
is the defect of this indictment
charge a general intent to defraud
aided by the I 9 th section of the
instead of charging an intent to
same Act, which declares that 'It
defraud a particular person, but
shall be sufficient in any indict- the charge must, nevertheless, conment for forging, offering, disposing
tain all the necessary elements of a
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criminal offence, and must set forth
an instrument in its nature and
upon its face of a character to
injure some one, or must show this
by averment of extrinsic facts. It
was not intended to say that every
indictment charging forgery, which
alleges that the act was done with
intent to defraud, should be sufficient. As well there might be
said that, under the language of
the same section, every indictment
charging the offence of obtaining
property by false pretences, which
alleges that the act was done with
intent to defraud, is sufficient-a
proposition which was distinctly
repudiated by the Supreme Court
in Com. v. Frey, 14 Wright, 245,
where it was expressly ruled that
such an indictment in order to be
good, must set forth particularly
what the false pretences were."
Judge Thayer further says in the
same case:
"This section of the Crhminal
Procedure Act was not intended to
authorize a loose method ofcriminal
pleadifig, by which air accused
person might be put upon trial
uppn general, vague, .indefinite,
and insufficient charges, but only
to compel him to make his objections to the indictment before the
trial instead of afterwards, and this
is the constructiofi which has been
put upon it by this court, in Com.
V. Galbraith, 6.Phila. Rep. 281, and
by the Supreme Court in Coin. v.
Frey, 14 Wright, 249."
People v. Foote, 52 N. W. 1036
Mich. (1892) :
Variance between complaint and
warrant not fatal when complaint
contained the truth.
Asking defendant of criminal
acts when under cross-examination.
PeiJury.-Walker z,. State, ii So.
R. 4oi (Ala.): Indictment which

alleges proceeding in which oath
was taken, name of officer before
whom taken, his authority to take
it, its falsity and materiality.
Rivers v. States, 12 So. R. 434,
Ala. (1893): Indictment for perjury must state the facts falsely
sworn to, and the officer or court
before whom or in which the
offence was committed.
Indictment charging that defendant did
corruptly give or offer to give $3
with intent to induce him to commit a certain crime punishable as
felony, to wit, the crime of perjury,
was insufficient. Williams v. Com.
91 Pa. 493 (1879): Indictment for
perjury. Oath was set out. Motion
to quash denied, but Bill of Particulars granted, Justice Trunkey
saying : "In simplifying the indictments it was not the intention to
make their brief ajnd comprehensive
terms a cover for snares to be
sprnngupon the accused." Grattan
v. State, 71 Ala. 244 (1892): Not
sufficient to follow words of statute
unless the indictment alleges the
fact in doing or not doing of which
the offence consisted.
Offences againstthe LiquorLaws.
-U. S. Simmins, 96 U. S. 36o :
Indictment for illegal distilling.
Defendant was charged with procuring to be used, a still. Held,
that the party who used the still
should be named. "The accused
must be apprised with reasonable
certainty of the accusation against
him . . . . an indictment not so
framed is defective although it may
follow the language of the statute."
State v. Stephen, 12 So. R. 883;
Seifried v. Com. Ioz Pa. 200: Indictment under general liquor law,
act committed in a locality having
a special prohibitory status. Indictment held insufficient. Offenses against the Post Office
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Laws.-U. S. v. Hess, 124 U. S. 204:
Indictment for "scheme to defraud
.... by means of the post office
establishment of U. S."
Indictment in words ofstatute insufficient.
Blaspihemy.-Undegraff v. Com.
ii S. & R. Pa. 41o: In an indictment for blasphemy, words complained of should be set out. Com.
v. Prenner (Anarchist Case), Q. S.
Phila., December Term, 1891, No.
494, M. S. S.
Slander.-Davis v. State, 22 S.
XV. 979, Texas (1893) : Information
for slander described words spoken
in presence of P. Complaint had
stated them as being spoken in
presence of G. Held, variance.
Libel.-AMiles v. State, i So. R.
4o3, Ala. (1892): An affidavit
which does not charge an offence,
does not authorize the issue of a
warrantandsubsequentprosecution.
Defendant tried "for defamation.
Affidavit that defendant "maliciously spoke . . . . imputing the com-

mission of a felony by J. W. R."
While in the words of the act the
statute does not prescribe with
definiteness the constituents of the
offence. "The defendant has the

constitutional right to demand the
nature and cause of his accusation,
so that he may identify the particular charge and offence:" Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 666; Anthony
v. State, 29 Ala. 28 ; Beasley v.
State, 18 Ala. 535; Grattan v.
State, 71 Ala. 344; Carter v. State,
55 Ala. 1t; Luter v. State, 225 W.
iio (Tex.); 15 Criminal Law Mag.,
pages 750-56.
Ofurder.-Little v. State, 33 N.
R. R. 417 (1893), Ind: Indictment
for murder in words of statute.
Held, bad as not giving circumstances.
Citing: State v. Record,
56 Ind. 507; 1o Amer. & Eng.
Ency. 522; I Best Criminal Practice, 599-6oo; Shepherd v. State,
54 Ind. 25; Howard v. State, 67
Ind. 401; Thomas v. Com. 20 S.
W. 226, Kentucky (1892).
Larceny.-State v. Van Cleve, 32
Pac. R. 461 (Washington): Name
of owner material. Amendment
not allowed. McCowan v. State,
22 S. W. 955 Ark. (1893) : Indictment for larceny charging theft of
two jackets owned by "Conneevey
& Co.," names of firm not stated.
Held, insufficient.
R. C. R.

